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Using International Law in Somalia’s PostConflict Reconstruction
CHIARA GIORGETTI*
For the first time since 1991, Somalia has an internationally-recognized government. Established in August 2012, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) has
been officially recognized by many nations and international organizations. The process of bringing Somalia fully back into the international community,
however, remains long and complex. This Article argues that, in order to be successful, Somalia’s reconstruction must include a robust international law
component. By mandating frameworks for action and
establishing best practices, international law should
guide and strengthen reconstruction efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
For the first time since 1991 and after twenty years of lawlessness, signs of normalcy have begun to appear in Somalia. In August 2012, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) was established.
The United States recognized the SFG on January 17, 2013, and
normalized its relationship with the country.1 Many other governments and international organizations also normalized relations with
Somalia in the belief that the seemingly unresolvable civil war was
finally over.
However, the supposed new beginning may just be wishful
thinking. Its international recognition notwithstanding, the SFG has
little effective or direct control over the majority of the country. Its
existence is ensured largely by a military mission under the aegis of
international bodies, namely, the African Union and the United Nations. Civilians continue to suffer from conflict-related abuses, and
the presence of the al-Qaida affiliated terrorist group al-Shabaab remains strong.2 Tellingly, Somalia continues to top the lists of “most
failed” and “most corrupt” countries in the world.3
The challenges and contradictions faced by Somalia therefore
make it the perfect case study to assess the use and effectiveness of
international law in post-conflict regions. Indeed, state failure, which
so distinctively characterizes Somalia, does not result in the application of any distinct international legal framework. It is considered a
non-event in international law, which still lacks both a definition of
state failure and an agreed legal framework to deal with its causes
and consequences.4 This means that, under international law, no special set of rules applies or is triggered by state failure.5
1. See U.S. Relations With Somalia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU
AFFAIRS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm.

OF

AFRICAN

2. Matt Bryden, Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2013), available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf; see infra Part
I.B.
3. The Failed State Index 2013, FUND FOR PEACE (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable; Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 10, 2013), http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/.
4. Chiara Giorgetti, Why Should International Law Be Concerned About State
Failure?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469 (2010).
5. Additionally, international law obligations continue to exist and continue to be
binding, irrespective of the situation of state failure—and thus the inability to fulfill those
obligations. See generally CHIARA GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE FAILURE:
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Thus, important questions need to be answered: How can
Somalia regain its place as a member of the U.N. and other international organizations? How can it reengage with donors and in the
diplomatic arena? More urgently, how can the new government deal
with border security, piracy, and terrorism, all of which pose international threats? How can it guarantee territorial and maritime borders
that became porous and undefined during the civil war? What basic
international legal framework is needed to attract private investments?
This Article demonstrates that international law is an appropriate, logical source to answer such questions. Globalization has
made state action necessarily have inter-state ramifications, in such a
way that implicates international law. Post-conflict reconstruction,
too, is inter-state dependent and should formally include an explicit
international law component.
Part I of this Article explains the present situation in Somalia
and the main challenges facing the SFG. Part II assesses the current
role that international law plays in Somali reconstruction, both inside
and outside of Somalia. Finally, Part III argues that international law
can strengthen post-conflict reconstruction efforts and further
demonstrates, based on specific examples, that international law can
play at least three fundamental roles in post-conflict situations: it can
mandate a framework for action, offer guidance by indicating core
issues, and provide examples of best practices.
I. RECONSTRUCTION OF SOMALIA: PROCESS AND PRIORITIES
In August 2012, Somalia completed a long process of political transition, which resulted in the National Constituent Assembly’s
adoption of a provisional constitution, the election of a new president, federal parliament, and speaker, and the naming of a new prime
minister and cabinet.
For the first time since 1991, when Siad Barre fled Mogadishu and left a long-lasting power vacuum, Somalia has an internationally-recognized government, the SFG. The new President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was elected on September 10, 2012. He is a
respected figure who was a civil society activist and researcher.6
As the following sections demonstrate, signs of normalcy
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS (2010).
6. BRYDEN, supra note 2, at 4.
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have appeared throughout Somalia. However, in many instances,
such positive progress is countered by equally strong deteriorations.
After assessing the positive and negative trends that have emerged
from Somalia’s new reality, this section highlights several key issues
that the new government must address in its post-conflict transition.
A. The New Somali Federal Government: An Ongoing Process
Following the ouster of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia was engulfed in protracted civil war. Clan-affiliated warlords and
militants battled for control. Somalia soon became the emblematic
symbol of state failure.7
During that period, Somalia lacked a functioning government
capable of providing for the basic needs of its people, including security, physical and legal infrastructures, education, health services,
administrative and political systems, and environmental and emergency protection. As a failed state, Somalia was no longer able “to
perform the job of a nation-State in the modern world.”8 Somalia also became the center of arms, drugs and human smuggling, the host
of Islamic extremist terrorist groups, and the focus of piracy activities; thus, it also became a problem for the international community.9
Numerous efforts at mediation and reconciliation were attempted over the years, and a transitional government was finally established in 2004. Somalia’s political transition included the election
of a new federal parliament and speaker, the adoption of a provisional constitution, the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President,
and the naming of a new prime minister and cabinet.10 General elec7. See GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5.
8. Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WASH. Q. 85, 87
(2002). Zartman usefully defines the consequences of state failure as follows: “As the
decision-making center of the government, the State is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are
not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced . . . . As a territory,
it no longer assures security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization. As the
authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs,
and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. . . . [n]o longer functioning,
with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the
right to rule.” William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in
COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 1, 5 (I. William
Zartman ed., 1995).
9. See KEN MENKHAUS, SOMALIA: STATE COLLAPSE AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM
17 (2004) (calling Somalia “a failure among failed States”).
10. James Fergusson, Somalia: A Failed State is Back From the Dead, THE
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/somalia-a-
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tions are now scheduled for 2016.11 Eventually, several governments
and international organizations officially or de facto recognized the
new government.
1. The First Step: International Recognition by Governments and
International Organizations
The United States recognized the new government of Somalia
on January 17, 2013 and subsequently normalized its relationship.12
Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the announcement at a
joint press conference with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Secretary Clinton congratulated the President and said that,
though “there [was] still a long way to go and many challenges to
confront,” one could already see “a new foundation for the better future being laid.”13 The United States has also welcomed the African
Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) success in driving the alShabaab terrorist organization out of strategically important population centers, and has underscored the continued U.S. commitment to
support AMISOM and the Somali national forces in their responsibility of ensuring security throughout Somalia.14 U.S. recognition
opened up new foreign assistance programs, including military train-

failed-state-is-back-from-the-dead-8449310.html.
11. Farhia Ali Abdi, Somalia: 2016 Election: Optimism, Misgivings, and Leadership
Analysis,
HORN
TRIBUNE,
http://horntribune.com/somalia-2016-election-optimismmisgivings-and-leadership-analysis-2/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see AFRICAN UNION
MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM), CONSULTATIVE MEETING ON ENDING THE TRANSITION IN
SOMALIA: STATEMENT ON ADOPTION OF THE ROADMAP (2011), available at http://amisomau.org/2011/09/signed-statement-and-roadmap/.
12. Tom Watkins, After More than 2 Decades, U.S. Recognizes Somalia, CNN (Jan.
17, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/us/somalia-recognition/ (reporting that
Secretary Clinton declared “we have moved into a normal sovereign-nation-to-sovereign
nation position and we have moved into an era where we are going to be a good partner, a
steadfast partner, to Somalia as Somalia makes the decisions for it own future”). For an
interesting analysis of the pros and cons of recognition for Somalia, see THE HERITAGE
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE U.S. RECOGNITION OF SOMALIA: IMPLICATIONS AND THE
WAY FORWARD, HIPS POLICY BRIEFING 1 (2013), available at http://www.
heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/HIPS_Policy_Brief_001-2013_ENGLISH.
pdf (warning that “in the past, Somali politicians never missed an opportunity to miss an
opportunity,” and that “[w]hat Somali politicians and citizens should have been euphoric
about is not the recognition itself—as the case has been—but the fact that in the eyes of
United States, Somalia’s fortunes have improved so well that the U.S. wants to recognize
it”).
13. Watkins, supra note 12.
14. See U.S. Relations, supra note 1.
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ing and financing programs.15
Other governments, such as Italy and the United Kingdom,
followed suit.16 In October 2012, the Foreign Minister of Italy, Giulio Terzi, visited Somalia, the first such high-level visit by an Italian
government official in two decades.17 Twenty-two years after it
closed, a new British embassy was opened by Foreign Secretary William Hague in Mogadishu on April 25, 2013.18 On February 2, 2012,
Matt Baugh was accredited as the first British Ambassador to Somalia in twenty-one years.19 Neil Wigan succeeded him in June 2013.20
British embassy staffers are stationed in a compound at the international airport in Mogadishu until the construction of the new British
embassy is completed.21 Other countries that have officially or de
facto recognized Somalia and have established relations with the
SFG include Turkey, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Kenya, and
Ethiopia.22
Several international organizations have also officially recognized the new Somali government. Importantly, for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has officially recognized the new
15. See Watkins, supra note 12.
16. The United Kingdom opened the core office within the new British embassy at
Mogadishu International Airport on April 25, 2013. See Foreign Secretary Opens New
British Embassy in Mogadishu, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Apr. 25, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-opens-new-british-embassy-inmogadishu.
17. Italian FM in Surprise Visit to Somalia, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2012, 12:31 PM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012102493628246538.html.
18. Foreign Secretary Opens New British Embassy in Mogadishu, supra note 16.
19. About
Matt,
FOREIGN
&
COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE
http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/mattbaugh/about-matt/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).

BLOG,

20. British Ambassador to Somalia Neil Wigan:
Biography, FOREIGN &
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, https://www.gov.uk/government/people/neil-wigan (last visited
Oct. 30, 2014).
21. Foreign Secretary Opens New British Embassy in Mogadishu, supra note 16.
22. See REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RELATIONS BETWEEN
TURKEY AND SOMALIA, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-somalia.en.mfa
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014); NORWAY: THE OFFICIAL SITE IN KENYA, NORWAY AND SOMALIA,
(June 9, 2013), http://www.norway.or.ke/News_and_events/Somalia/#.UoPg2JHnlSU;
EMBASSY OF SWEDEN: NAIROBI, SWEDISH AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED TO SOMALIA (Apr. 17,
2013), http://www.swedenabroad.com/Pages/StandardPage.aspx?id=55539&epslanguage=e
n-GB; NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN NAIROBI, KENYA, SOMALIA, http://kenia.nlembassy.org/
organization/departments/somalia.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); Mahmoud Mohamed,
Presidential Inauguration Ushers in New Era for Somalia, SABAHI (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/09/17/feature-01.
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government.23 The World Bank, the U.N., and the European Union
have established relations with the SFG.24 One of the immediate
consequences of recognition was that the European Union accepted
the request from Somalia to accede to the ACP-EU Partnership
Agreement (the “Cotonou Agreement”), allowing Somalia to access
development finance cooperation.25
The election of the SFG has also prompted the return of some
basic services. Turkish Airlines started a bi-weekly direct flight linking Ankara to Mogadishu.26 Several other airlines also now fly regularly to Somalia’s capital and other major towns.27 Additionally,
Somalis may soon get international mail for the first time in twentytwo years.28
At the same time, several donor conferences were organized
in 2013 to assist and coordinate activities in Somalia. On May 7,
2013, for instance, the British Government hosted a conference
aimed at providing international support to Somalia. A special conference on Somalia, addressing the socio-economic development
agenda, was also held on the margins of the fifth Tokyo International
Conference on African Development in May 2013.29 Importantly,
23. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Recognizes the Federal
Government of Somalia After 22-Year Interval (Apr. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13119.htm (stating that “[t]he International
Monetary Fund (IMF) today recognized the Federal Government of Somalia, headed by
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, paving the way for the resumption of relations after a
22-year interval. The decision is consistent with broad international support and recognition
of the Federal Government. Recognition of the government allows the IMF to offer Somalia
technical assistance and policy advice”).
24. Press Release, Council of the European Union, 3245th Council Meeting 14 (July
22, 2013) [hereinafter CEU Press Release], available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138317.pdf (welcoming the progress
made in Somalia and reconfirming “its support for the Federal Government”).
25. Somalia Joins the Cotonou Agreement, SABAHI (June 9, 2013),
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2013/06/09/newsbrief-05;
see CEU Press Release, supra note 24, at 15 (welcoming “the recent decision of the Joint
EU-ACP Council of Ministers on Somalia’s accession to the Cotonou Agreement”).
26. Somalia: Turkish Airlines Begins Flights to Mogadishu, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012,
11:55 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17269620.
27. Daisy Carrington, Flying into Hostile Territory: Somalia Experiences Boom in Air
Travel, CNN (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/21/world/
africa/somalia-aviation-boom/.
28. Tom Miles, Return to Sender? Maybe Not as Somalia to Restart Mail 22 Years on,
REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/26/us-somalia-postalidUSBRE93P0QF20130426.
29. Eric Johnston, Somalia Seeks Return to Global Fold, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 1,
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the European Union and Somalia co-hosted a major donor meeting in
September 2013 in Brussels, which developed a New Deal Compact:
a soft-law agreement that proposes to work in partnership with the
SFG.30 At the conference, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud identified four goals for his government: security, meeting basic
human needs, good governance, and foreign investment. The New
Deal Conference saw the participation of representatives of many
governments and international organizations, including the African
Development Bank, the African Union, the U.N., and the World
Bank.31 High-ranking participants included the British Secretary of
State for International Development, the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and the French and Norwegian Ministers of International
Development.32
The U.N. Security Council adopted two important resolutions
relating to Somalia in 2013. Resolutions 2093 and 2102 extended the
AMISOM mandate for another year and established the U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) as a new U.N. presence to assist
with the stabilization and peacebuilding activities of the SFG.33 The
“Somalia End of Transition Roadmap,” approved by the government
and key international partners in 2011, calls for holding a constitutional referendum in 2015 and a political election in Somalia in
2016.34
2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/06/01/national/abe-africa-leaders-hopesomalia-can -return-to-the-global-fold/#.UcM0sxYYLjQ/.
30. Somalia Conference: What Next, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (May 13,
2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/somalia-conference-what-next/.
31. A New Deal for Somalia: Brussels Conference, Sept. 16, 2013, List of Heads of
Delegation, http://eeas.europa.eu/somalia/new-deal-conference/participants.html.
32. Id.
33. Special Conference on Somalia on the Margins of TICAD V: Co-Chairs’
Summary, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (June 1, 2013),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page5e_000011.html (reporting that “[t]he Special
Conference on Somalia was held in Yokohama, Japan on May 31, 2013, on the margins of
the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V). The
Conference was co-organized by the Government of Japan, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Somalia and the African Union Commission, and was attended by Heads of
State and Government, Ministers and high-level representatives from 35 countries and
organizations”).
34. Briefing: Somalia’s Political Roadmap, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION
NETWORKS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/94926/briefing-somalia-spolitical-roadmap (detailing tasks needed to develop more permanent political institutions
and greater national security and stability in Somalia). The tasks relate to security issues, the
drafting of a new constitution, political outreach and reconciliation, and ensuring good
governance. The Roadmap also details measures to counter piracy and local militia groups,
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Selecting a new government is a breakthrough for Somalia.
Returning to its place as a fully functioning actor in the international
community, however, will take much time and effort.
2. The Second Step: Addressing the Other Side of the Coin
The positive response to the new government may, however,
just obscure a tale of two cities. Indeed, the newly-established government has little effective control over important parts of the country. Its existence is ensured by a military mission conducted by the
African Union and ongoing assistance by the U.N. and other donors.
Civilians continue to suffer from conflict-related abuses, including
killings, displacement, and the diversion or confiscation of humanitarian assistance by armed groups, principally al-Shabaab.35
Like its predecessors, the SFG has little effective control over
most of the country. The self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the
northwest and Puntland State in the northeast are powerful regional
authorities and their relations with the SFG remain unclear.36 According to the U.N., as of January 2014, there were more than 1.13
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, and many
Somalis have left Somalia and established residence in other countries, including the United States, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands.37
The vast majority of Somalis still lives in a humanitarian crisis. Serious human rights abuses continue. These include killings,
discrimination and violence against women and girls, rape and female genital mutilation, violence against journalists, and restrictions
38

prevent the recruitment of children into armed groups, plan for elections, develop
peacebuilding initiatives, and tackle corruption.
35. Security and Governance in Somalia:
Consolidating Gains, Confronting
Challenges, and Charting the Path Forward Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Andre Le Sage, Senior
Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University); id. (statement of Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, African Affairs); id. (statement of E.J. Hogendoorn, Deputy Africa
Program Director, International Crisis Group).
36. Statement of Andre Le Sage, supra note 35.
37. 2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Somalia, UNHCR (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6&submit=GO.
38. Humanitarian Bulletin: Somalia, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
AFFAIRS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/OCHA%20Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20August%202014.pdf.
HUMANITARIAN
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on freedom of the press.39 Other major human rights abuses include
harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, arbitrary and politically
motivated arrests and detentions, denial of fair trials, corruption, trafficking in persons, abuse of and discrimination against minority
clans, restrictions on workers’ rights, forced labor, and child labor.40
Most of the abuses remain unpunished, and impunity remains the
norm.41
These dual images of Somalia—a resurrected nation and a
heavily-burdened one—coexist, and they vividly demonstrate how
much needs to be done. The creation of the new government has
nonetheless made it possible to discuss and identify specific postconflict priorities, which I discuss below.
B. Post-Conflict Priorities
International recognition is an important first step for Somalia
in regaining its place as a full member of the international community.42 However, to truly regain its domestic and international status,
the SFG needs to address at least three key challenges pertaining to
security, economic, and human rights issues.
1. Security Issues
Despite external recognition, security remains the main concern in Somalia. Security threats are multifaceted and include terrorism, piracy, and disputed maritime and territorial borders. These
threats have been acknowledged by the international community. For
example, on April 4, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama renewed
the national emergency with respect to Somalia declared by Executive Order 13536 of April 12, 2010.43
At least three security issues are imperative and need to be
39. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
SOMALIA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/204377.pdf.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. at 29.
42. In general, recognition is for states, not governments. The case of Somalia blurs
that difference and calls for a rethinking of these norms. See STEFAN SALOMON, THE
RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 1998).
43. Letter from President Barack Obama, President of the United States, to John
Boehner, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives and Joseph Biden, President
of the U.S. Senate (Apr. 3, 2014) (on file with the COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT’L L.).
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addressed for Somalia to exit state failure and become an effective
member of the international community.44 First, Somalia’s territorial
and maritime boundaries remain undefined and contested. Due to the
long conflict, Somalia’s international territorial borders have become
porous. The delimitation of the borders with Ethiopia to the west and
with Kenya to the south and west are not clear. Moreover, internally,
Somalia remains a fragmented country. Though the provisional Constitution provides for a federal system, it does not identify the constituent federal states.45 During the civil war, Somaliland, a former
British colony located at the northeast region of the country, declared
independence and has been able to create a relatively peaceful administration. Somaliland is not recognized as an independent state by the
international community, however. In turn, Somaliland does not itself recognize the new federal government.46 Discussions on how to
address the impasse are ongoing, including a recent meeting mediated by Turkey between Somalia and Somaliland, which resulted in the
signing of the “Ankara Accords.”47 Other regions, including Puntland and Jubaland, enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. Yet the provisional Constitution provides no indication of the power sharing
structure to be adopted.48
Similarly, maritime boundaries remain unclear. Somalia enjoys the longest coastline in Africa, affording it substantial fishing resources and navigation routes. More recently, several companies
have expressed an interest in beginning oil exploration in these wa44. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5.
45. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION art. 7 (Som.) (stating at (1) that “the sovereignty of the
Federal Republic of Somalia extends over all the territory of the Federal Republic of
Somalia, which includes the land, territorial sea, the island, the subsoil, the airspace, and the
continental shelf, and any land and waters that join the Federal Republic of Somalia in
accordance with a law that shall be passed by the Federal Parliament,” and at (4) that “[t]he
boundaries of the Federal Republic of Somalia shall be those described in the 1960
Constitution of Somalia.”); see id. art. 49(1) (providing that “the number and boundaries of
the Federal Member States shall be determined by the House of the People of the Federal
Parliament”); id. art. 49(2) (“The House of the People of the Federal Parliament, before
determining the number and boundaries of the Federal Member States, shall nominate a
national commission which shall study the issue, and submit a report of its finding with
recommendations to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament.”).
46. See THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA, THE SOMALI COMPACT (2013), available
at http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf.
47. Somaliland and Somalia Sign Seven Point “Ankara Accords” During Tripartite
Meeting in Turkey, SOMALILAND SUN (Apr. 13, 2013, 11:25 PM), http://somalilandsun.com/
index.php/politics/2666-somaliland-and-somalia-sign-seven-point-ankara-accords-duringtripartite-meeting-in-turkey.
48. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION art. 54 (Som.).
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ters.49 The location of the maritime boundaries between Kenya and
Somalia, however, is disputed.50 There are overlapping claims for a
portion of the maritime region, and the boundaries have not been officially delimited. These unclear boundaries create conflict and destabilize the region.
A second security issue is terrorism. Somali-born al-Qaida
affiliate al-Shabaab remains a paramount concern.51 The attack in
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 vividly
demonstrated the ability of the group to launch deadly attacks even
outside of Somalia.52 Al-Shabaab training camps and safe havens exist in Somalia, and the group’s influence in Somalia remains a concern.53 These well-founded terrorism fears make it impossible to fully transition to normalcy.
A third security concern is piracy. Piracy off the coast of
Somalia has been rampant. Commercial ships are routinely attacked
and held for ransom.54 Pirates have been mostly active in Puntland,
but have covered a large maritime area.55 Swift actions by the international community—chiefly thanks to a U.N. Security Council resolution that allowed foreign military ships to enter Somali waters to
repress piracy—have significantly reduced pirate attacks since 2012,
when the number of attacks dropped by nearly 70% from the previous year.56 However, piracy continues to be an important security
49. See, e.g., Mark Townsend & Tariq Abdinasir, Britain Leads Dash to Explore for
Oil in War-torn Somalia, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 25, 2012, available at http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/25/britain-oil-dash-somalia; Kelly Gilblom, Turkish Oil
Firm Genel to Explore Somalia from 2013, SOMALILAND PRESS (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://somalilandpress.com/turkish-oil-firm-genel-to-explore-in-somalia-from-2013-36900.
50. Somalia Sues Kenya at Top UN Court over Maritime Border, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/somalia-sues-kenya-top-un-court-overmaritime-225946278.html.
51. Statement of Andre Le Sage, supra note 35, at 2.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Somali al-Shabab Training Base in Lanta-Buro ‘Captured’, BBC NEWS (Jul. 11,
2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18800452.
54. Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, 13 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (2009), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/13/issue/2/international-legal-responses-piracy-coast-somalia.
55. Jillian Keenan, Puntland is for Pirates: Why are Convicted High-Seas Bandits
Being Sent to the Somali Region that Profits from Their Crimes?, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 20,
2014, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/20/puntland_is_for_
pirates_somalia.
56. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1816 (June 2, 2008); Monitoring Group on
Somalia and Eritrea, Report, transmitted by letter dated July 12, 2013 from the Chairman of
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concern.
2. Economic Issues
There can be no reconstruction of Somalia into a viable new
state without the development of a sophisticated economic system.
Such a system must be able to sustain a financial flow that can support the structure of the new state, support a vibrant private sector,
and provide essential goods to all Somalis. Yet Somalia has no banking system and the only remaining international bank, Barclays,
which channels most remittances to Somalia from abroad, has threatened to close the accounts Somali remittance companies use to
transmit money.57
Since the recognition of the new government, however, donors have demonstrated a new willingness to allocate funds to Somalia.58 For example, the European Union’s Political and Security
Committee, the key body that defines and monitors the Union’s crisis
response as part of the E.U. Common Foreign and Security Policy,
made its first visit to Somalia on June 12, 2013.59 Similarly, the
recognition of the provisional government by the United States has
opened up the potential for Somalia to access funds deposited in the
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank prior to the civil war.60 Section 25B of
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907
(2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶
53, U.N. Doc. S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013); see Alan Cowell, West African Piracy Exceeds
Somalia Attacks, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/africa/west-african-piracy-exceeds-somaliattacks-report-says.html.
57. Chris Spillane, Somalia Asks Barclays to Review Closing Money-Transfer Account,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-23/somaliaasks-barclays-to-review-closing-money-transfer-account.html.
58. Henry Ridgwell, Donors Pledge $2.7 Billion in ‘New Deal’ for Somalia, VOICE OF
AMERICA (Sept. 16, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/eu-pledges-650million-euros-for-somalia-reconstruction/1750496.html/.
59. Press Release, Magali Uytterhaeghe, EU Mission to Somalia, The EU’s “Political
and Security Committee” Visits Somalia (June 12, 2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
somalia/documents/press_corner/20130612_en.pdf (noting that “[t]he [Committee]
underlined the commitment of the EU to the new political [organization] and the people of
Somalia, and the extensive support for the normalization of the situation in Somalia both
politically and in terms of security”).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2006) (“No attachment or execution shall be issued against any
Federal Reserve bank or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding
in any State, county, municipal, or United States court. Whenever (1) any Federal Reserve
bank has received any property from or for the account of a foreign state which is recognized
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the Federal Reserve Act provides that the Secretary of State may recognize accredited representatives of foreign states to the U.S. government and name such persons to receive and control property .61
The newly approved Somali New Deal Compact resulted in the
pledge of $2.7 billion for the implementation of a New Deal to help
rebuild the country, including $870 million from the European Union.62
In light of this newfound donors’ interest, two fundamental
issues must be resolved before more funds may be allocated directly
to the government. First, a financial management system must be
implemented, including anti-corruption legislation, and a banking
system must be in place. Second, the question of Somalia’s foreign
debt must be addressed.
Some donors mistrust the ability of Somalia’s government to
handle large amounts of foreign money because of corruption. Somalia is considered the most corrupt country in the world. In a recent
report, the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia heavily criticized the
former governor of the newly established Central Bank of Somalia,
accusing him of maintaining a slush fund and reporting that the great
majority of approved expenses were untraceable and made for private
purposes.63 The Somalia National Bank is the Central Bank of Somalia and, as such, it is tasked with managing Somalia’s monetary
policy, including managing interest rates, setting reserve requirements, and acting as a lender of last resort to the banking sector during financial crises.64 Without a working and credible Central Bank,
Somalia will be unable to fully operate in the global financial market.
by the Government of the United States, or from or for the account of a central bank of any
such foreign state, and holds such property in the name of such foreign state or such central
bank; (2) a representative of such foreign state who is recognized by the Secretary of State as
being the accredited representative of such foreign state to the Government of the United
States has certified to the Secretary of State the name of a person as having authority to
receive, control, or dispose of such property; and (3) the authority of such person to act with
respect to such property is accepted and recognized by the Secretary of State, and so
certified by the Secretary of State to the Federal Reserve bank, the payment, transfer,
delivery, or other disposal of such property by such Federal Reserve bank to or upon the
order of such person shall be conclusively presumed to be lawful and shall constitute a
complete discharge and release of any liability of the Federal Reserve bank for or with
respect to such property.”).
61. Id.
62. Ridgwell, supra note 58.
63. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Report, supra note 56.
64. CENTRAL BANK
2014).
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Moreover, Somalia owes approximately $1.8 billion in principal arrears on long-term debt,65 with its total external debt valued at
more than $3 billion.66 Although the IMF recognized Somalia’s new
government, Somalia remains ineligible to borrow from it because of
its outstanding arrears, which in April 2013 amounted to approximately $352 million.67 A fundamental question for the new Somali
government is how to clear these arrears and thus gain access to the
international financial markets, without overburdening and antagonizing private and public revenue bases.68
It is likely that the payment of arrears and the question of debt
relief will be negotiated with all involved actors, including the IMF,
the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, once the SFG
demonstrates its commitment to financial stability. In the past, a bid
donor has taken charge of repaying the entire debt, and this scenario
may materialize in Somalia’s case as well.69 In the meantime, the
question of how to re-launch the Somali economy and attract foreign
investments remains fundamental.
3. Human Rights and Transitional Justice
Accountability for past human rights violations and abuses is
a fundamental step for reconciliation. Accountability, even decades
65. Somalia: Principal Arrears, Public and Publicly Guaranteed (Current US$),
QUANDL, http://www.quandl.com/WORLDBANK/SOM_DT_AXA_DPPG_CD (last visited
Oct. 30, 2014) (defining principal in arrears on long-term debt as “principal repayment due
but not paid, on a cumulative basis. Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an
original or extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed to nonresidents by
residents of an economy and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Data are in
current U.S. dollars”).
66. Somalia: External Debt Stocks, INDEXMUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/
somalia/external-debt-stocks (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (defining total external debt as the
“debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external
debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt,
use of IMF credit, and short-term debt”).
67. IMF Recognizes the Federal Government, supra note 23.
68. Matt Baugh, Somalia and the G8: Push to Start, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE: GLOBAL CONVERSATIONS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/mattbaugh/
2013/04/10/somalia-and-the-g8-push-to-start/ (“[T]he process is reciprocal. [International
Financial Institutions] re-engagement is contingent on the commitment of the Federal
Government of Somalia continuing to make progress on strengthening transparency and
accountability (both to Somalis and its partners).”).
69. Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (current USD),
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (last visited Oct. 16,
2014).
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late, strengthens the chances of durable peace and security. Allegations that crimes against humanity and war crimes were and still are
committed in Somalia have come from different sources. The U.N.,
for example, called for the prosecution of those who allegedly committed atrocities in 1993—more than twenty years ago. Other similar
calls have followed.70
Subsequent appeals for investigations and accountability have
continued.71 In 2013, the U.N. Security Council stressed “the need
for the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure that all perpetrators
of serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law are held accountable.”72 The
U.N. Secretary-General then requested that the local staff offer the
government assistance in order to “review, develop and implement
legislation necessary to comply with international human rights and
protection standards . . . [and] provide assistance . . . [to] monitor[]
and report[] on grave violations of children’s rights [as well as other
grave human rights violations.]”73
70. S.C. Res. 814, ¶¶ 8, 35, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) (noting with deep
regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of international
humanitarian law and requesting that the Secretary-General assist in the re-establishment of
a Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional, or national level, to assist in the
restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order, including the
investigation and facilitation of the prosecution of serious violations of international
humanitarian law); Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia,
Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights, Comm’n on
Hum. Rts., ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/110 (Jan. 26, 2000) (by Mona Rishmawi)
(declaring that many acts that could be qualified as war crimes or crimes against humanity
were committed in Somalia, which could give rise to international criminal jurisdiction,
either by an international criminal tribunal or by the exercise of universal jurisdiction by
national courts, and encouraging the authorities in foreign countries to take steps to bring to
justice those suspected of committing such crimes in Somalia); Special Rapporteur of the
Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the
Field of Human Rights, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/103 (Jan. 26,
2000) (by Mona Rishmawi) (“[T]he establishment of an international tribunal for Somalia
might be envisaged at some stage.”).
71. See, e.g., IHASA’s Current Research: Transitional Justice in the Context of
Somalia, ALLIANCE FOR PEACEBUILDING: INSTITUTE FOR HORN OF AFRICA STUDIES AND
AFFAIRS (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2013/09/ihasas-currentresearch-transitional-justice-in-the-context-of-somalia/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD
REPORT 2011 165–70 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/wr2011.pdf; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2011: SOMALIA (2011),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/somalia/report-2011.
72. S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. S/Res/2102 (May 2, 2013).
73. U.N. Secretary-General, Results of the Secretary-General’s Technical Assessment
Mission to Somalia, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2093, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc.
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Importantly, the SFG has also recognized the importance of
human rights.74 The Provisional Constitution provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission—the implementation acts, however, have not yet been drafted.75
The establishment of a new, internationally recognized federal government for Somalia is an important development. It brings
Somalia closer to the international community and has resulted in an
increased interest and commitment by its members. Resolving security problems, tackling financial questions, and addressing the issue
of past human rights violations are necessary priorities for the success of the SFG.
II. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
SOMALIA
Numerous international actors are present in Somalia to assist
the SFG in its reconstruction efforts. These include international organizations, state donors, and non-governmental organizations. These actors are engaged in an essentially political process, but among
the many advisors and experts working in Somalia, legal advisors are
absent.76 Indeed, the present reconstruction approach adopted by the
international community does not include an explicit international
S/2013/239 (Apr. 19, 2013).
74. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2102 (May 2, 2013) (“Welcoming
the Federal Government of Somalia’s commitment to improving human rights in Somalia,
expressing its concern at the reports of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial
killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive
sexual and gender-based violence, particularly in camps for internally displaced persons, and
underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those
who commit any such related crimes.”).
75. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION art. 111(I) (Som.) (providing that: “(1) There shall be
established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to foster national healing, reconciliation
and unity and to ensure that matters relating to impunity, revenge and other triggers of
violence are addressed through a legal and state directed process. (2) The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission shall be independent, impartial and representative and shall
include: traditional elders and leaders, members of the Federal Parliament, respected
members of civil society, judges and security personnel. (3) The mandate of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission shall include: (a) Bearing witness to, record, and in some cases,
grant amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes relating to human rights violations, and
rehabilitation of the criminals; and (b) Promoting forgiveness, reconciliation and national
unity”).
76. This is an observation that I made during my trip to Kenya and is further supported
by interviews with Somali experts.
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law component.
This section first reviews the approach presently adopted by
the U.N. and other actors in the international community to postconflict reconstruction. It then explains why international law must
play a role in post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, it focuses on Somalia’s most important existing international law obligations to show
how fundamentally intrinsic international law has become to all state
action.77
A. Lack of An International Law Component
Some experts have recently argued that a special set of rules
should apply to post-conflict situations. These rules, aptly referred to
as jus post bellum, would apply to situations after a war is ended.78
Jus post bellum aims to create a body of law that applies after a war
ends, in the important period of reconstruction. It includes a responsibility of the victors to participate in the reconstruction of the defeated country.79 These rules, however, apply only in the aftermath
of an international conflict, where victors and losers are clearly defined. In Somalia, the extensive civil war has not created clear winners. Moreover, this doctrine applies only in international conflicts
and therefore does not apply to the civil war in Somalia.
77. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at xv–xvii.
78. See Carsten Stahn, Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello . . . ‘Jus post Bellum’?, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 921, 921 (2006); see also SYMPOSIUM, Just and Unjust Warriors: Marking the 35th
Anniversary of Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 13 (2013); Antonia
Chayes, Chapter VII½: Is Jus post Bellum Possible?, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291 (2013);
Guglielmo Verdirame, What to Make of Jus post Bellum: A Response to Antonia Chayes, 24
EUR. J. INT’L L. 307 (2013); Larry May, Jus post Bellum, Proportionality and the Fog of
War, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315 (2013); Ruti Teitel, Rethinking Jus post Bellum in an Age of
Global Transitional Justice: Engaging with Michael Walzer and Larry May, 24 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 335 (2013).
79. The paradigmatic shift that the creation of a jus post bellum would entail is welldescribed by Verdirame, supra note 78, at 311–12 (“It is hard to think of the emergence of
an obligation to reconstruct incumbent upon the victors as a superficial addition to the
existing law. It would rather signal a paradigm shift in the legal regulation of war: from a
Grotian approach to a Kantian one . . . . In this discussion we should not lose sight of what it
is within the power of victors to accomplish. Although the states that won a conflict, and the
international community in general, may help with reconstruction, success does not
ultimately depend on them. It would be unfair to impose an obligation of result on the
victors where that result is one that they cannot deliver. It might even be counterproductive
if it ended up supporting the perception among the defeated that reconstruction is the
responsibility of others. Ultimately, unless people acquire a sense of political ownership and
moral urgency about their future, there can be reconstruction only in the most superficial of
senses.”).
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There is also a significant corpus of state and international institutional practice that addresses various kinds of post-war situations. These, however, are essentially ad hoc political processes.
The U.N., for example, identified post-conflict peace building and
reconstruction as a separate area of intervention more than twenty
years ago with the Agenda for Peace.80 Since then, the U.N. has been
involved as an advisor in numerous post-conflict situations, including
in Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Iraq, Lebanon,
and Somalia.81
More recently, in December 2005, the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions to create the
Peacebuilding Commission.82 The Commission, presently chaired by
Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil, aims to bring together all relevant actors to advise and develop integrated strategies
for post-conflict peace building and recovery; to focus attention on
the reconstruction and institution-building efforts needed for postconflict recovery; to improve coordination within and outside the
U.N.; to develop best practices; and to ensure predictable and longlasting financing for early recovery.83
80. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc.
A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) (“Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly
successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures
which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being
among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction
of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel,
monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening
governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political
participation.”).
81. See Ongoing Political and Peacebuilding Missions, U.N. DEP’T OF FIELD SUPPORT,
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/ppbm.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see
also Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY14, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1269623894864/Harmonizedlistoffragilesta
tesFY14.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
82. See G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 20, 2005); S.C. Res. 1645,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).
83. See generally Mandate, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en
/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The Peacebuilding Commission
(PBC) operates in three principal configurations: the Organizational Committee, the
Country Specific Configurations, and Working Groups on Lessons Learned. Structure &
Membership, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/
structuremember.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The thirty-one members of the PBC
Organizational Committee include seven each for the General Assembly, the Security
Council, and the Economic and Social Council, five for the top providers of military
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The World Bank has also singled out “Fragile and Conflictaffected Situations” (FCSs) as a priority for its goal to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. In 2011, the World Bank dedicated its annual World Development Report (WDR) to “Conflict, Security and Development.” The 2011 WDR called for a paradigm shift in the
development community’s approach to fragile and conflict-affected
situations.84 The shift was premised on the idea that violence and
other challenges could not be resolved by short-term solutions and
that comprehensive institutional strengthening was necessary to provide security, justice, and jobs to people, and thus ensure long lasting
peace.
Separately, several states affected by conflict and that are undergoing a transition to the next stage of development have created a
voluntary association called the “g7+.”85 The objectives of the g7+
are to share experiences and learn from each another, to promote
state-building and peacebuilding, and to advocate for reforms in the
way the international community engages in conflict-affected
states.86
These efforts signal the growing interest of addressing postconflict reconstruction through the lenses of international law. The
effort is still nascent, however, and requires further development.
Two particular and important post-reconstruction frameworks
are specifically applicable to the situation in Somalia: the government-centered New Deal Compact and the international communityoriented UNSOM. Neither, however, espouses an international law
approach. Each is examined in detail below.

personnel and civilian police to U.N. missions and five for the top providers of assessed and
voluntary contributions to U.N. funds. Organizational Committee Members, U.N.
PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/orgcommittee.shtml (last
visited Oct. 30, 2014). The PBC is now active in Burundi, the Central African Republic,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Country Specific Configurations, U.N.
PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/countryconfig.shtml (last
visited Oct. 15, 2014).
84. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT, SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/
Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf.
85. Introduction, G7+, http://www.g7plus.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). Member
countries presently include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte D’Ivoire,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Island, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Togo.
86. Id.
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1. The New Deal Compact
In October 2013, the Somali government and several donors
met in Brussels to draft and finalize the New Deal Somali Compact.87
New Deal Compacts are documents negotiated between new governments in fragile states and members of the international community within the framework developed by the 2011 Fourth High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea.88
The Somali Compact outlines priorities and commitments of
the SFG and how international funds will be used for recovery.89
The New Deal Compact sets priorities and new support for the reconstruction of Somalia for 2014 to 201690 and is based on an inclusive
process initiated by the government of Somalia and the international
community in December 2012.91 It is designed to provide an overarching strategic framework that coordinates political, security, and
development efforts with the aim of ensuring peace and promoting
statebuilding.92 In line with previous New Deal Compacts, the Somali government identified five strategic objectives to support Somali peace- and statebuilding goals: (1) inclusive politics, (2) security,

87. A New Deal Compact for Somalia, G7+ (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.g7plus.org/
news-feed/2013/10/8/a-new-deal-compact-for-somalia.
88. New Deal Compacts represent a new way for the international community to
engage with fragile and failing states. See generally INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON
PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING, A NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES
(2013), available at http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/new-dealfor-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf. On November 30, 2011, the “New Deal for
Engagement in Fragile States,” which was developed through the forum of the International
Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, was presented and widely endorsed at the 4th
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea. The New Deal Compacts were
developed as a new way to tackle the specific problems of fragile and failed states working
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Donor countries and several
international organizations recognized that transitioning out of fragility was a long political
process requiring the engagement and ownership of receiving countries. New Deal Pilots
are currently being implemented in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor Leste together with
several partners. See generally New Deal Pilots, NEW DEAL, http://www.newdeal4peace.
org/new-deal-pilots/ (last visited on Oct. 30, 2014).
89. See THE SOMALI COMPACT, supra note 46.
90. The EU and Somalia to Hold “The New Deal for Somalia Conference, 16 Sept.
2013,” EUR. COMM’N. (Jul. 30, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/ashton/
topics/20130729_en.htm.
91. See THE SOMALI COMPACT, supra note 46, at 3.
92. Id. at 4–12.
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(3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services.93
Each strategic objective then identifies specific priorities and action
items.
Priority 1 of the justice strategic objective, for example, requires that “key priority laws in the legal framework, including on
the reorganization of the judiciary, are aligned with the Constitution
and international standards.”94 Priority 4 under the security strategic
objective calls for the development of “an effective maritime security
strategy within the framework of the Maritime Resource and Security
Strategy.”95 Priority 1 of the economic goundations strategic objective urges enhancing “the productivity of high priority sectors and related value chains, including through the rehabilitation and expansion
of critical infrastructure for transport, market access, trade, and energy.”96
Each of the priorities is to be further developed with specific
milestones that include delivery dates and assigned responsibilities
within the government and by the development partners’ support.
These milestones, however, are either very vague or altogether lacking. In the context of the justice priority, for example, the milestones
are to create a Legal Policy and Drafting Unit by 2014, to establish a
Constitutional Court and a Judicial Service Commission, and to review existing legal frameworks including the organization of the judiciary and witness and victim protection—without giving any further details on mandates and structures.97 Similarly, the security
priority requires the government to ratify the Somali Maritime Security and Resource Strategy by 2014 and to create a maritime coordination mechanism.98 The economic foundation priority is equally
vague and requires the strengthening of productive sectors, the completion of two flagship programs on “Rapid Rehabilitation of Infrastructure,” and the preparation of a growth strategy program, though
it does not specify who within the government is responsible for accomplishing any of these goals.99
International law is not one of the enumerated pillars and is
not identified as a cross-sectorial tool to implement existing priori93. Id. at 5–13.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 34.

2014]

USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOMALIA

71

ties. However, international law obligations permeate all of the identified priorities and goals. Given Somalia’s international obligations,
international law provisions should be better taken into account in the
development of action items.
2. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
From an international perspective, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously established UNSOM on May 2, 2013, for an initial renewable term of twelve months.100 UNSOM’s core role is to act as
an enabler to foster an environment that can support the stabilization
and peacebuilding process.101 Within this role, UNSOM’s mandate
is to provide policy advice to the SFG and to AMISOM on a variety
of issues including peacebuilding and statebuilding, governance, security sector reform and rule of law, development of the federal system, and coordination of international donors’ support.102
Specifically, UNSOM will focus on four key areas:
•

•

•

Good offices: support reconciliation efforts, assist
with mediation and facilitation in support of the Government to deliver core political tasks, such as the development of a federal system, the constitutional review process and subsequent referendum on the
constitution, and preparations for elections in 2016;
Rule of law and security sector: support the Government’s priority objectives of transforming and building Somalia’s security and justice institutions by
providing technical advice and aligning security sector
reform, rule of law (including police, justice and corrections), disengagement of combatants, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration, maritime security,
and mine action;
Human rights: promote awareness and respect for
human rights with a focus on women’s empowerment,
child protection, and prevention of conflict-related
sexual and gender-based violence; strengthen Somalia’s justice and human rights institutions; monitor, in-

100. S.C. Res. 2102, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2102 (May 2, 2013).
101. UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA, UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN SOMALIA (2013), available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx
?fileticket=TUqlSABGCOA%3d &tabid=9705 &mid=12667&language=en-US.
102. Id.
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vestigate, prevent, and report on any abuses or violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law committed in Somalia; support the Government to
review, develop, and implement necessary legislation
in compliance with international human rights standards; and
• Coordination of international assistance: support the
Government’s efforts to coordinate donor support, in
particular for security sector assistance and maritime
security, stability and recovery, public finance management and capacity development, working with bilateral and multilateral partners through the New Deal
framework.103
Both the New Deal Compact and the UNSOM mandate specify important policies and priorities to enable post-conflict reconstruction. The Compact is directed mostly to the SFG, and provides for
collaboration with numerous international actors. Conversely,
UNSOM focuses on actions to be taken by the international community to assist the SFG in reconstruction efforts. Both plans essentially
provide policy directions but do not provide guidelines or frameworks to be followed to achieve the desired outcomes. Furthermore,
neither plan includes a separate international law component or explicitly refers to the use of international law provisions. This is
shortsighted. As the next section demonstrates, international law can
be immensely useful in Somalia’s post-conflict reconstruction.
B. The Importance of International Law
Increased globalization and the interconnectedness of states’
actions mean that international law necessarily plays an increasingly
important role in all states’ actions.104 As such, post-conflict priorities cannot be appropriately addressed without referring to international law. Indeed, becoming an effective player in the international
community has become a necessity for any country in order to ensure
its development, to guarantee basic rights and protections to its people, and to promote stability within the international community.

103. Id. at 1–2; see S.C. Res. 2102, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2102 (May 2, 2013).
104. See, e.g., Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance
and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L. 1, 1
(2006) (arguing that “globalization and the rise of global governance are transforming the
structure of international law . . . the distinction between domestic and international law
becomes more precarious”).
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States are increasingly interconnected and interdependent:
each state must perform actions that have both domestic and international components and functions.105 State actions that are regulated
by interconnected international and domestic provisions include, at a
minimum:
• Defense and justice: increase border patrols; collaboration to combat transnational criminal activities; antiterrorism activities; extradition and judicial collaboration; the development and implementation of rules to
curb human, arms, and drug trafficking; and immigration policies;
• Public health: directed at controlling safety and hygiene, the containment of epidemics and other emergencies, health hazards and diseases for both humans
and animals, the regulation of environmental transboundary activities, agricultural and veterinary imports and exports;
• Commerce and trade: include banking and financial
services, custom regulations, trade and investment
measures, collection of duties, and commercial and
trade permits;
• Transport and communication: include the obligations
to grant and provide safety in national airspace; control of coasts and maritime zones; and access to ports,
roads, and railways. Other included activities relate to
postal, radio, telephone, satellite, and electronic communications; and
• Diplomatic and representative functions: increase representations at international and multilateral posts and
conferences; diplomatic and consular services; reception of foreign diplomats; and consular officers.106
Given the number of issues that are regulated by both international and domestic laws, a post-conflict process that lacks an international law component also ignores fundamental consequences of a
state’s activities. For these reasons, and as discussed below, Somalia
needs to reenter the web of inter-state and international private relations created and regulated by international law to fully recover from
conflict.
Another important role that international law can play in the
reconstruction of post-conflict countries is to offer guidance by indi105. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 1–8.
106. Id. at 5.
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cating core and priority issues for action. Because of the complexity
of contemporary relations, it can be challenging to acquire and maintain an overview of the priorities and functions that states need to execute. This problem is compounded in post-conflict situations, where
governments also need to reengage in many domestic and international functions, which they used to perform, but either ceased to perform or lack the capacity to fully perform because of the conflict.107
Referring to existing international law can be especially useful to
highlight the means needed to reengage with the international community and to accomplish identified priorities.
C. Somalia and International Law
Somalia is party to 209 bilateral and multilateral treaties.108
These treaties include the Charter of the U.N. and regulate issues like
privileges and immunities, diplomatic and consular relations, human
rights, refugees, narcotic drugs, health, international trade and development, transport and communications, navigation, educational and
cultural matters, the status of women, criminal matters, the law of the
sea, telecommunications, disarmament, the environment, and fiscal
matters.109
More specifically, these treaties address fundamental topics
such as human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. They further include
treaties on environmental protection, such as the Basel Convention
on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal and the Convention on Biological Diversity and
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
Somalia is also a party to the primary treaties related to diplomatic
and consular activities: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Somalia is
likewise a member of several international organizations and is a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). It has ratified several bilateral agreements on financial cooperation.

107. In many cases, newly nominated Ministers have little or no help to implement their
strategies and there are too few civil servants.
108. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Somalia’s Treaties, https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTS
Online.aspx?id=3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (select “Somalia” under Historical/Existing
Values; then click “Search”).
109. U.N. Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
(last visited Nov. 2, 2014) https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx.
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Since its establishment, the SFG itself has demonstrated an
interest in international law through both its domestic and international actions. Domestically, Somalia’s Provisional Constitution,
adopted on August 1, 2012,110 contains several references to international law principles. For example, Article 41 requires the Federal
Parliament to establish a Human Rights Commission as an independent body. Its objective is to promote understanding of human rights,
set implementation standards and parameters for the fulfillment of
human rights obligations, monitor human rights protections within
Somalia, and investigate allegations of human rights violations.111 In
the application of Article 41, a draft law was presented for discussion
to the Somali Parliament in the Summer 2013.112 Similarly, Article 7
states that any international boundaries dispute should be resolved in
accordance with international law.
Internationally, the SFG was keen to retake control of the
Somali airspace soon after its establishment, which encompasses a
large strategic section that is crossed by both north-south flights from
Europe to Africa and east-west flights from Africa to Asia.113 During
the civil war, and from 1992 to 2013, the airspace of Somalia was
managed by an International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO)/U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) project based in
Nairobi, which controlled civil aviation and collected overflying
fees.114 Issues that needed to be resolved included the location of the
main air traffic control facilities and fee-sharing arrangements with
the breakaway province of Somaliland. In May 2013, Somali Minister for Information Ellmoge announced that, after nineteen years,

110. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION (Som.).
111. Id. ch. 2, art. 41 (Som.) (stating that “(1) The Federal Parliament shall establish a
Human Rights Commission that is independent of State control, and has adequate resources
to carry out its functions effectively. (2) The functions of the Human Rights Commissions
shall include the promotion of knowledge of human rights, and specifically Shari’ah, setting
implementation standards and parameters for the fulfillment of human rights obligations,
monitoring human rights within the country, and investigating allegations of human rights
violations”).
112. Draft Law (2013) (on file with the author). The law made no reference to
international human rights standards. Additionally, similarly to the functions of the Human
Rights Commission, Somalia’s human rights treaties obligations require monitoring and
investigation of human rights violations.
113. See Flight Information Region Map, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION, http://gis.icao.int/appsilver/ICAOFIR2014/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2014)
(select “WORLD ROUTE 2014/UPP Routes op 2014/NAVH”; then zoom in on “FIR
MOGADISHU HC SM”).
114. GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 31.
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Somalia had regained control over its airspace.115 The plan was in
compliance with ICAO requirements and provided for a fee-sharing
agreement between Somaliland and Somalia.
Interestingly, the new government of Somalia also acceded to
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). On May 29, 2013, it deposited its instrument of accession to the CWC with the U.N. Secretary-General.116 “After thirty days, the Convention entered into force
for the country, making Somalia the 189th State Party to the treaty.”117
Given the nature and extent of Somalia’s international obligations, post-conflict reconstruction must include an explicit international law component, which is now missing. Somalia’s post-conflict
priorities cannot be properly addressed without applying and explicitly referring to international law. In fact, increased globalization and
the interconnectedness of states’ actions mean that international law
necessarily plays an increasingly important role in all of a state’s activities, including post-conflict reconstruction.118
III. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOMALIA’S RECONSTRUCTION
The section above demonstrates that, although no overarching
international legal framework is specifically applicable to postconflict reconstruction, international law permeates all actions by
states and private parties, from trade to immigration and from food
safety to travel.119 Post-conflict reconstruction requires a sophisticated approach by sophisticated users. International law can mandate
resolution frameworks and provide analyses that can assist in understanding complexity.120 Furthermore, reconstruction efforts require
115. Somalia Regains Control over Its Air Space, ALLAFRICA (May 13, 2013),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201305140319.html.
116. Somalia Joins the Chemical Weapons Convention, ORGANISATION FOR THE
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (May 31, 2013), http://www.opcw.org/news/
article/somalia-joins-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ (“On 29 May 2013, Somalia
deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. . . . This will reduce to seven the number of States
that have not yet joined.”).
117. The CWC is a widely ratified convention: Only seven countries have not yet
joined. Id.
118. See GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH, supra note 5, at 4–6.
119. Id. ch. 1.
120. American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., Mar. 28–31, 2012,
106th Annual Meeting Final Program: Confronting Complexity, available at http://www.
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coordination with efficient international instruments.121
By including an international law component in post-conflict
priorities, international law can provide a framework for action and
best practices. These translate into specific items to facilitate the reconstruction in Somalia in its identified priorities. This section highlights three specific examples of how international law can address
the three priorities—security, economic development, and human
rights—discussed above and identified by the SFG. First, as a tool to
strengthen security, international law can provide a framework to assist in the delimitation of maritime boundaries by using principles
found in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Second, as a
way to meet the economic goals, international law can provide issues
for action and encourage economic development through the negotiation of international investment treaties. Third, as an instrument to
implement the transitional justice and human rights priority, international law transitional justice examples can be used as best practices
to identify instruments to foster reconciliation in Somalia.
A. Security Objectives: International Law Can Mandate a
Framework for Action to Delimit Maritime Borders
As discussed above, one of the main security priorities confronting Somalia is the delimitation of the maritime border in the Indian Ocean.122 International law can provide a framework to immediately assist in the negotiation process and to facilitate a binding
delimitation of its maritime boundaries.
The primary dispute exists between Somalia and Kenya and is
now being fueled by natural resources.123 In fact, a contested mariasil.org/sites/default/files/ASIL_ANNUAL_MEETING_Program_2012.pdf.
121. See U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N, supra note 83.
122. See supra Part I.
123. The dispute became evident during a weekly SFG council of ministers gathering on
June 6, 2013, where officials discussed Somalia’s maritime borders. At the meeting, the
ministers “had agreed to make ‘null and void’ the 2009 maritime borders Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between Kenya and Somalia’s now-defunct Transitional Federal
Government (TFG). Adding fuel to the fire, the Somali Government, led by President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, officially ‘extended’ the country’s sea territory by 200 nautical
miles, and also defined the continental shelf as part of its maritime boundary.” Cassie
Blombaum, Stirring the Somali Waters: Toward a Maritime Oil War?, INKERMAN INSIGHTS
ON
GLOBAL
BUSINESS
THREAT
AND
VOLATILITY
(June
10,
2013),
http://blog.inkerman.com/index.php/2013/06/10/stirring-the-somalia-waters-toward-amaritime-oil-war/; Kim Moss, Somali-Kenya Maritime Boundary Dispute Remains
Unresolved,
FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
INTERNATIONAL
(June
12,
2013),
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time zone that both Kenya and Somalia claim may have the potential
for oil exploration. Kenya identified several new offshore exploration blocks available for licensing, and all but one are located in the
contested area in the Indian Ocean.124 Private companies have approached both governments. Reportedly, French firm Total and Texas-based Anadarko obtained exploration licenses from Kenya for
blocks in the disputed area.125 At the same time, a Somali minister
reportedly granted similar rights to another foreign company.126 To
make matters even more complicated, separate concessions for both
on-land and off-shore drilling have allegedly been granted by a high
official in the Puntland administration.127 In January 2013, the Canadian company Africa Oil began its first on-shore drilling operation in
Somalia. Africa Oil estimated that its two drilling blocks could include reserves of up to four billion barrels, worth about $500 billion
at today’s prices.128
The exact amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the contested
maritime region are, of course, unknown. Initial reports, however,
estimate that the combined onshore and offshore reserves could be
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/energy-security/27-energy-securityswa/1091-somali-kenya-maritime-boundary-dispute-remains-unresolved.html.
124. Kelly Gilblom, Kenya/Somalia Border Row Threatens Oil Exploration, REUTERS,
Apr. 20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us-kenya-explorationidUSBRE 83J0M120120420.
125. Id.
126. Troubled Somalia Hustles Big Oil To Resume Exploration, UPI (Oct. 16, 2013,
12:58 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/10/16/TroubledSomalia-hustles-Big-Oil-to-resume-exploration/UPI-31691381942688/
(reporting
that
“Abdullah Haidar of Somalia’s Ministry of Natural Resources reported recently that
discussions in London with the major oil companies, including Conoco Phillips, Chevron
Corp. and Eni of Italy, ‘are going well’” and that “[t]he only Western company to sign up
with Mogadishu so far is the British company Soma Oil & Gas, established in 2012 and
headed by Lord Michael Howard, a former Conservative Party leader who’s held several
cabinet posts. It signed an agreement Aug. 6 and will conduct seismic surveys in designated
areas on land and offshore, and update historic seismic data for the government, in return for
nominating exploration and drilling rights for up to 12 blocks”).
127. See Alexis Flyn & Justin Scheck, Somalia Seeks to Restart Oil Exploration, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 7, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527
02303442004579121310761917156?mod=_newsreel_2 (reporting that “[a] number of small
companies have signed oil-exploration deals with regional authorities in Somalia, raising
tensions with the central government. The only company to sign an agreement with the
central government is private startup Soma Oil & Gas Ltd., which is conducting early-stage
data collection, its chief executive, Robert Sheppard, said in an interview last month”).
128. Somalia’s Oil Prospects Add New Dangers, UPI (March 1, 2012, 3:53 PM),
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/03/01/Somalias-oil-prospectsadd-new-dangers/UPI-81601330635213/.
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substantial, and could amount to as much as 110 billion barrels of
oil.129 The development of natural resources in Somalia could therefore be a turnaround for Somalia’s development and could bring
much needed revenue. At the heart of the matter is how to demarcate
the maritime boundary that lies between Somalia and Kenya. Kenya
claims that the maritime boundary should run east from the point
where the territorial border ends. Somalia claims that the border continues diagonally southeast into the Indian Ocean, following the general direction of the territorial border (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Contested Region between
Somalia and Kenya*

Clearly, an arrangement to delimit the Somalia-Kenya maritime border would be key to ensuring the successful development of
129. Id.
*

Original figure from Blombaum, supra note 123.
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offshore resources. Without assurances that the maritime borders are
finally delimited, however, oil companies may not invest in exploration and research and thus possible revenues will not be produced.
Indeed, the ongoing dispute over their maritime boundary has already
deterred interest in developing the offshore blocks.130 It is thus crucial to both Somalia and Kenya that their border dispute be resolved.131 In fact, the U.N. has also warned that Western commercial
oil exploration in the disputed areas, as well as existing discrepancies
over which authorities could issue licenses, “could spark further conflict.”132 The U.N. experts were also concerned about a request by
Norway to Somalia to implement an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) off its coast, which they highlighted may be connected with
commercial interests held by a Norwegian oil company.133
International law provides the necessary instruments and
frameworks to resolve the dispute finally and satisfactorily. Both
Somalia and Kenya are parties to UNCLOS, which they both ratified
in 1989.134 UNCLOS includes detailed provisions on how to regulate
130. The U.N. Monitoring Group reports that Kenya suspended a concession to a
Norwegian company because of the ongoing dispute. See Michelle Nichols & Louis
Charbonneau, Exclusive: Western Oil Exploration in Somalia May Spark Conflict—U.N.
Report, REUTERS, July 17, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/ussomalia-oil-un-idUSBRE96G06R20130717 (“The U.N. report said late last year that Kenya
had suspended Statoil’s license for block L26 because the Norwegian company did not want
to spend money on exploration while there was the legal uncertainty over the maritime
border with Somalia.”).
131. See Moss, supra note 123 (explaining that “one of the most important issues arising
from the inability of the two countries to come to an agreement on their maritime boundary,
is that their legal claims to sell exploration blocks and collect revenue from any subsequent
discoveries, are at risk. Kenya’s Petroleum Energy Commissioner, Martin Heya, has
previously confirmed that companies awarded exploration rights in the contested area, will
be unable to begin exploration/drilling until the boundary dispute is settled, as it is unclear
which country will receive the revenue from any subsequent resource discoveries. . . . This
comes at an unfortunate time, because the wider East Africa region has attracted
considerable international interest and most importantly, promises of investment, following
large discoveries of oil and natural gas”).
132. See Nichols & Charbonneau, supra note 130.
133. Id. (stating “[e]fforts by Norway to lobby Somali officials to adopt the EEZ now
coincide with current Norwegian interest in the fate of L26 [blocks which are contested with
Kenya] as well as with Norwegian involvement in the application of a Special Financing
Facility donor fund of $30 million which has been allocated under the management of
[Somali government] officials with a track record of corruption”).
134. Somalia ratified the Convention on July 24, 1989, and Kenya ratified it on March
2, 1989. See U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of
Ratifications Of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements
as at 3 October 2014 [sic] (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/
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boundaries in specific sections of the sea. Using UNCLOS as a
framework to resolve the maritime dispute is useful in at least two
ways. First, UNCLOS provides recognized principles to resolve the
substance of the dispute. Second, UNCLOS provides a way to resolve disputes by a binding decision, should inter-state negotiations
fail to reach an agreement.
UNCLOS provides that the sovereignty of a coastal state extends to the territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical
miles, measured from the baselines determined in accordance with
provisions of the Convention itself.135 The Convention also provides
for the establishment of an EEZ defined as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea” and subject to a specific legal regime established by the Convention. The legal regime governs the rights and
jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other
states.136
The EEZ is limited to 200 nautical miles from the state’s
baselines. In the EEZ, the coastal state retains:
[S]overeign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources
whether living and non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil,
and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and
winds.137
UNCLOS also defines the obligations applicable to the continental shelf, which comprises “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas”138 that extend beyond the territorial sea and through the
natural prolongation of the territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines if the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend to
that distance.139 Under UNCLOS, the coastal state exercises soverchronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
135. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
136. Id. art. 55.
137. Id. art. 56(1)(a); see id. art. 55 (governing the specific legal regime of the exclusive
economic zone); id. art. 56 (governing the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state
in the exclusive economic zone); id. art. 76 (governing the definition of the continental
shelf); id. art. 83 (governing the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts).
138. Id. art. 75.
139. Id.
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eign rights of exploration and exploitation of its natural resources
over the continental shelf.140 It also maintains an exclusive right to
authorize and regulate drilling of the continental shelf for all purposes.141
Importantly, UNCLOS provides means to delimit both the
EEZ and the continental shelf for states with adjacent coasts, as is the
case between Somalia and Kenya.142 The relevant provisions refer to
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which
indicates the appropriate international legal instruments to be used to
resolve the dispute.143 The provision also signals that an equitable
solution should be achieved.144 Pending agreement, the states concerned shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements
of a practical nature in a spirit of understanding and cooperation.
During the transitional period, the states shall not jeopardize or hamper the conclusion of the final agreement. These arrangements are
without prejudice to the final delimitation. Interestingly, Kenya
claims that such a provisional arrangement exists and was signed as a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in April 2009 with the TFG,
a previous incarnation of the SFG.145 Somalia, however, has maintained that the MoU is invalid and registered its rejection of the MoU
with the U.N. Secretariat in March 2010.146
140. Id. art. 77.
141. Id. art. 81.
142. Id. arts. 74, 83 (governing the EEZ and the continental shelf respectively).
143. Id.; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946 I.C.J. art. 38 (“The Court,
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the
Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.”).
144. UNCLOS, arts. 74, 83.
145. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of
Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to Grant to Each
Other No-Objection in Respect of Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf
beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Kenya-Som., Apr. 7, 2009, 2599 U.N.T.S. 35; Blombaum, supra note 123.
146. U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Somalia (July 17, 2014),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/SOM.htm
(“By a note verbale dated 2 March 2010, the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to
the United Nations informed the Secretariat that the MOU had been rejected by the
Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and ‘is to be hence treated as
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The framework provided by UNCLOS can thus fruitfully
guide the negotiation for the delimitation of the maritime borders between Somalia and Kenya. Pursuant to the rules governing the territorial sea, the EEZ, and the continental shelf under UNCLOS, Kenya
and Somalia could reach an agreement that is based on the principles
and sources of international law. UNCLOS also provides that an equitable solution should be achieved, with the interests of both parties
taken into consideration. Pending the agreement, both parties should
refrain from taking any actions that could jeopardize and hamper the
final agreement and should act in a spirit of cooperation and understanding. These guiding principles provide each party with an important framework for negotiation. They also allow for the same
guiding principles to be used by both parties, and thus clarify parties’
expected behavior and provide a level playing field.
Further, if no agreement is reached within a reasonable period
of time, UNCLOS can guide the process to a legally binding agreement decided by a neutral arbitral tribunal.147 Part XV of UNCLOS
provides an efficient dispute resolution mechanism through a binding
international arbitration process administered by the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, to which both Kenya and Somalia have access.148
This binding process has been used successfully on several occasions. For example, in the arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, the arbitral tribunal was also confronted with a request to demarcate the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf between
the two adjacent claims of Guyana and Suriname. Both claimed an
overlapping area for which they had both given exploration concessions.149 Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal delimited the maritime border applying the provisional equidistance line approved by the parties.150
By encouraging the use of the international law framework
provided by UNCLOS, Somalia could address the fundamental issue
non-actionable.’”).
147. UNCLOS, arts. 74, 83.
148. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 115 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012).
149. Guyana v. Suriname, 139 I.L.R. 566 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
150. Id. ¶¶ 392–400. Note that in that situation, oil explorations had begun and, in the
view of the tribunal, Suriname had threatened to use force on an oil rig and drill ship that
had permission from Guyana and which Suriname claimed was within its jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶
435–39. For another interesting case, see The Government of the State of Eritrea v. the
Government of the Republic of Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribuinal in the Second Stage
of the Proceeding (Maritime Delimitation), 119 I.L.R. 417 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999).
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of maritime boundary delimitation with Kenya. This will be important for economic development, security issues, and the restoration of a good relationship with an important neighbor. Moreover,
because both Somalia and Kenya are parties to UNCLOS, if they fail
to find an agreement by consent, both have access to a binding dispute resolution mechanism that can effectively resolve the issue and
delimit the maritime border once and for all.
In addition to providing useful and mandatory frameworks for
action, international law can also indicate priorities and issues for action that are particularly important for post-conflict reconstruction.
B. Economic Objectives: International Law Can Offer Core Issues
for Action for Economic Development
A second key priority identified by the SFG is economic recovery, which is generally key in post-conflict situations.151 Providing means of economic growth is crucial to ensuring a successful and
sustainable reconstruction and it is an integral part of a comprehensive restructuring and stabilization effort.152 Economic growth programs not only enhance the well-being of the general population, but
can also reduce the risk of returning to conflict.153
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, with one
of the lowest GDPs per capita. Ensuring the flow of foreign direct
investment is particularly important to stimulate economic recovery.154 To attract international investment, it is vital to provide an
environment that welcomes investments and adequately addresses the

151. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies 1
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2902, 2002), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2902 (“We find that during the
first three post-conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal, but that in the
rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level.”); see THE SOMALI
COMPACT, supra note 46; SECURING PEACE:
STATE-BUILDING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES (Richard Kozul-Wright and Piergiuseppe
Fortunato eds., 2011).
152. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. OFFICE OF ECON. GROWTH, A GUIDE
GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES VI (2009).

TO

ECONOMIC

153. Id. (“The purpose of economic growth programming in post-conflict countries is
both to reduce the risk of a return to conflict and to accelerate the improvement of wellbeing for everyone, particularly the conflict-affected population.”).
154. THE WORLD BANK, INVESTING ACROSS BORDERS 2010: INDICATORS
1 (2010).

DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATION IN 87 ECONOMIES

OF FOREIGN

2014]

USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOMALIA

85

concerns of investors while protecting their interests.155 To ensure
such an environment and demonstrate their commitment to economic
stability, many capital-importing countries have participated in the
negotiation of bilateral or multilateral international investment treaties (IIAs) with capital-exporting countries.156
IIAs are international agreements that regulate the conditions
for private investments by national and foreign companies.157 Typically, they provide a number of guarantees to investors, including
protection from expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, free
transfers of means and full protection and security. An important and
distinctive feature of many IIAs is to provide a specific and alternative dispute resolution mechanism, which allows recourse to international arbitration rather than the use of domestic courts in case of an
alleged violation of the investment treaty. Most often, international
investment arbitration occurs under the arbitration rules of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) or of the United National Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
In the specific case of Somalia, the negotiations of IIAs
would be particularly important, especially to foster and reengage relations with key trade partners. Before the beginning of the civil war,
Somalia had entered into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), namely with Germany and Egypt.158 Since 1985, however, it has not ne155. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2013: Global
Value Chains:
Investment and Trade for Development (2013), http://unctad.org/
en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf (concluding that developing countries have taken the
lead in attracting foreign direct investment and that “[m]ost governments are keen to attract
and facilitate foreign investment as a means for productive capacity-building and sustainable
development”).
156. Id. (“By the end of 2012, the regime of international investment agreements (IIAs)
consisted of 3,196 treaties. Today, countries increasingly favor a regional over a bilateral
approach to IIA rulemaking and taking into account sustainable development elements.”).
157. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 6–8 (2d ed. 2008); see generally U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev.,
World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies:
Implications for Development (2006), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2006_en.pdf (discussing
BITs); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2004: The Shift
Towards Services (2004), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2004_en.pdf (discussing the
Canadian model BIT).
158. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties Signed by
Somalia (June 1, 2013), http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_somalia.pdf
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gotiated, signed, or ratified any new BITs and has remained completely excluded from the international investment arbitration movement.
The negotiation and drafting of IIAs by Somalia can be informed by existing IIAs and their interpretation by international arbitral tribunals. The principles that are included in existing IIAs could
be used by the Somali government as priorities for consideration and
for possible inclusion in IIAs signed by Somalia. Some of the most
common IIA principles are included in Figure 2. They could serve as
an initial negotiation starting point and blueprint for discussions with
other interested parties.

Figure 2: Sample Negotiating Blueprint
Negotiation principle

Observations

Conclusions

Bilateral or regional approach?
Applicable law?
Definition of investment?
Confidentiality?
Type of expropriation protection?
Definition of fair and equitable treatment
Full protection and security
Include umbrella clause?
Provide national treatment?
Provide Most Favored Nation Treatment?
Allow ICSID Arbitration?

(reporting that Somalia concluded a BIT with Egypt on May 29, 1982 (which entered into
force on April 16, 1983) and with Germany on Nov. 27, 1981 (which entered into force on
February 15, 1985)).
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At the same time, joining the ICSID Convention would guarantee an efficient and neutral binding international dispute resolution
mechanism. Thus, any IIA signed by Somalia should include a binding international dispute resolution mechanism through international
arbitration. This would be also an important signal to potential investors.
Using international law to identify priorities offers an important tool to structure post-conflict reconstruction. The example of
IIAs, identified above, would be particularly important to ensure
economic reconstruction and to stimulate foreign investment.
C. Human Rights and Transitional Justice Objective: International
Law Can Offer Examples of Best Practices
A third way in which international law can assist in postconflict reconstruction of Somalia is by providing examples of best
practices, particularly for transitional justice issues, thus promoting
the third priority identified in Part I.159 Addressing and resolving issues of accountability for human rights violations is fundamental in
order to guarantee stability in post-conflict situations.160 Transitional
justice mechanisms consolidate peace, foster social and national reconstruction, and secure long-term peace.161
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution mandates the creation of a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to “foster national healing,
reconciliation and unity” and to ensure that “matters relating to impunity, revenge and other triggers of violence are addressed through
a legal and state-directed process.”162 The Commission has not yet
been established. At this point, therefore, other past examples can be
159. See supra Part I.
160. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, Summary, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (stating that
“recent years have seen an increased focus by the United Nations on questions of transitional
justice and the rules of law in conflict and post-conflict societies, yielding important lessons
for our future activities”).
161. Id. ¶ 2 (stating “our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the
consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of
peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for
grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of
disputes and the fair administration of justice”).
162. See PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION (Som.).
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particularly useful to guide the creation of the Commission and structure a comprehensive and effective transitional justice process in
Somalia.
Transitional justice has become an important part of all reconciliation processes. In addition to truth and reconciliation commissions, other transitional justice instruments include international ad
hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, domestic courts, and the International
Criminal Court (ICC). More than one instrument is often implemented in transitional justice processes.163 Assessing precedents can
serve as best-practice examples for Somalia and can be an important
tool to develop the best transitional mechanism for Somalia.164
Indeed, international law and transitional justice provide a real menu of options that could be used as examples for Somalia to develop its own transitional justice mechanism in application of the
Provisional Constitution.
The main goals of each transitional justice process vary. Specific goals are intrinsically linked to the nature of the conflict and
post-conflict priorities. Figure 3 identifies the main means and different goals of each transitional justice mechanism, and can also
serve as a template to assess best practices.165

163. For an introduction, see International Center for Transitional Justice, Fact Sheet:
What is Transitional Justice? (2009), http://www.ictj.org/sites /default/files/ICTJ-GlobalTransitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf.
164. Margherita Zuin, A Model of Transitional Justice for Somalia, 23 FLETCHER J.
HUM. SECURITY 89 (2008).
165. This is adapted from DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART,
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
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Figure 3: Goals and Means of Transitional
Justice Mechanisms
Int’l
Tribunals

Hybrid
Tribunals

Nat’l
Courts

Local
justice

Lustration/Com
pensation

TRCs

Retribution
Deterrence
Creating a record
Social healing
Individual healing
Due process
Rebuilding rule of
law

In terms of possible transitional justice mechanisms, several
choices are available. First, international criminal tribunals are available. The early 1990s witnessed one of the most significant recent
developments in international criminal law with the creation of two
ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were created by U.N. Security
Council Resolutions.166 These Tribunals have specific and primary
jurisdiction. The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes committed on
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and specifically
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.167 The
166. Procedurally, the Security Council first created two commissions of experts, both
of which, after examining the evidence, suggested the creation of ad hoc tribunals. Both the
ICTY and ICTR were created by Security Council resolutions adopted under U.N. Charter
Chapter VII. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) and S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), respectively, which are binding for all U.N. members.
The tribunals are both subsidiary, although independent, organs of the Security Council.
The ICTR is structurally linked to the ICTY, sharing the same Prosecutor, Appeal
Chambers, and prosecutorial staff.
167. See generally U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
http://www.icty.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
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ICTR has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and other serious
violations of international law committed in Rwanda, or by Rwandan
citizens in nearby states, between January 1 and December 31,
1994.168 The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR led, to a certain extent, to the creation of the ICC.
The ICC is the first permanent, treaty-based international
criminal court established to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern, for example, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. The ICC is a court of last resort and its jurisdiction
is retrospective only. The ICC is based on the 1998 Rome Statute,
which had 122 states parties as of November 24, 2014. Somalia has
not ratified the treaty and is therefore not a party to the ICC. The
ICC does not have jurisdiction over Somalia. Because of the existence of the ICC, additional ad hoc international criminal tribunals
would be hard to justify. However, given the unique situation of
Somalia, it is possible that sufficient political will may be summoned.
Second, hybrid criminal tribunals are available. They incorporate both international and national elements.169 Typically, a majority of the judges are international judges, and principles of international criminal law apply. At the same time, national judges
complement the court and specific principles of domestic law may
also apply. Generally, hybrid tribunals sit in the country in which

168. See generally U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www.
unictr.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
169. In the aftermath of the U.N.-brokered 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the
Sierra Leonean government and the Revolutionary United Front, and to begin a process of
national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone requested the U.N. to establish an
international court to prosecute those responsible for committing atrocities during the war.
With S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000), the Security Council
requested that the Secretary-General negotiate with the Government of Sierra Leone to
create an independent special court. In October 2000, the Secretary-General issued a report
to the Security Council outlining the characteristics of the court. The court is treaty-based
and established by a special agreement between the U.N. and the government of Sierra
Leone. It has primacy over domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone, but not in other states.
The Court has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and certain crimes
under Sierra Leonean domestic criminal law. It does not have competence over the crime of
genocide. The Court has personal jurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for those crimes. Its temporal jurisdiction began in 1996, the date of the first
failed peace agreement between the two parties, not the beginning of the civil war in 1991.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
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they focus. The tribunal’s staff includes both international and domestic personnel.170
Third, national courts are available. They are often considered the forum of first resort to prosecute human rights abusers.171
170. For example, in the Sierra Leone tribunal, the Chief Prosecutor, the Registrar, as
well as the majority of the Judges in both the Trial and Appeal Chambers are appointed by
the U.N. Secretary-General. See id. ¶¶ 47–48; see also id. Annex art. 2. The government of
Sierra Leone appointed the other judges as well as the Deputy Prosecutor. Id. art. 3. The
only other existing example of a hybrid tribunal was the ones established in Cambodia. See
Cambodian Genocide Program: Chronology, 1994-2004, YALE UNIV. (last visited Oct. 24,
2014), http://www.yale.edu/cgp/chron_v3.html. In July 2001, the Cambodian National
Assembly passed the final legislation enabling the establishment of a tribunal in conjunction
with the United Nations to try the former leaders of Khmer Rouge for genocide. See id.
Contrary to the Sierra Leone example, the majority of judges and prosecutors of the special
tribunal for Cambodia will be Cambodian, while only a minority will be international staff.
See Donald W. Beachler, The Quest for Justice in Cambodia: Power, Politics, and the
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 8 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 67, 69 (2013); see also
Cambodia: Background: A Long Road to Justice, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST.
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/cambodia; Criminal
Court for Cambodia: Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers Responsible for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, TRIAL (June 6, 2014),
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/tribunals/hybrid-tribunals/criminal-court-forcambodia.html.
171. See Hum. Rts. Watch, The International Criminal Court: How Nongovernmental
Organizations Can Contribute to the Prosecution of War Criminals, 8 (2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/icc0904/icc0904.pdf.
Recent cases of
prosecution in national courts offer a mixed outcome, which becomes questionable
especially in cases of prolonged mass abuses in poorer countries. See generally LEGAL VICE
PRESIDENCY, WORLD BANK, ETHIOPIA: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT (2004),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EthiopiaSA.
pdf. For example, the Ethiopian government announced its intention to bring to justice the
officials of the previous regime for crimes committed by the Dergue between 1974 and
1991, which included arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial
executions. See generally id. The protracted civil conflict and history of repression
debilitated its judicial system, which is weak and lacks a tradition of independence. Id. As a
result, the number of cases and the amount of evidence are challenging the capacity and
competence of the Ethiopian judicial system and its ability to impartially and effectively
prosecute the cases heard before it. Id. A similar situation is found in Rwanda. See
AMNESTY INT’L, RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE (2000), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/010/2000/en/8c1fc
557-df6b-11dd-acaa7d9091d4638f/afr470102000en.pdf. In the aftermath of the genocide of 1994, the Tutsi
government began to try offenders. Id. Six years after the genocide in Rwanda, there were
an estimated 125,000 people still in detention, including minors, the elderly, and the infirm.
Id. By January 2000, over 2,500 had been tried, several hundred of whom had been
sentenced to death. Id. At this pace, it will take about 400 years to process them all.
Rwanda suffers extreme poverty and has little tradition of judicial independence. See id.
Fear, insecurity, and a lack of personnel affect the proceedings. Id. Prisoners are often
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Because they are close to the facts, the victims, and the evidence,
courts of the state where the crimes were committed are at times considered the best and most inclusive form of accountability. Often,
however, in post-conflict situations such as in Somalia, an independent and skilled judiciary is lacking, and judges may have fled or may
have been the target of abuses themselves. Moreover, the judicial
system may lack financial means and may be overwhelmed by the
number of cases of a transitional justice process.
Fourth, local justice is available. The use of local or traditional methods of dispute resolution has become more common in
situations where the national judicial system does not function
properly. Provided that basic rights are respected, local justice
mechanisms could provide a good and locally-supported method to
deal with past abuses outside national courtrooms.172 Somalia’s traditional justice system, the Xeer, is based on clan affiliation. The use
of this traditional justice mechanism, in conjunction with other transitional justice means, could be particularly useful in fostering local
ownership and support for a transitional justice process.173
Fifth, lustration and compensation are available. Lustration
laws provide a mechanism to remove perpetrators of human rights
violations from positions of authority.174 Programs of reparation and
detained without due process and prisons are overcrowded and beatings and torture
common. Id. The judicial system of Rwanda is severely stretched and does not seem to be
able to handle the cases brought to it following internationally recognized standards. Id.
The cases of Argentina and Germany are also interesting because they highlight the
difficulties of effective prosecution in the case of strong internal opposition (the military in
Argentina) or where criminal behavior was widespread and a large part of the population
played a role in the former abuses (East Germany). See generally Int’l Ctr. for Transitional
Justice, Accountability in Argentina: 20 Years Later, Transitional Justice Maintains
Momentum, (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-ArgentinaAccountability-Case-2005-English.pdf; JUSTICE IN TRANSITION:
PROSECUTION AND
AMNESTY IN GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA (Gerhard Werle ed., 2006).
172. In Uganda, President Museveni reestablished “local council courts” at the village
level that could also hear land disputes. See Local Council Courts Act, 2006 (Uganda),
available at http://www.ulii.org/content/local-council-courts-act-2006. In Mozambique,
curandeiros, or traditional healers, played an important role in the reintegration of
combatants into their villages at the end of a particularly bloody conflict. SIGNE ARNFRED,
SEXUALITY & GENDER POLITICS IN MOZAMBIQUE: RETHINKING GENDER IN AFRICA 234
(2011).
173. See Zuin, supra note 164, at 94–96.
174. Lustration mechanisms may include total suspension from an assignment,
suspension from certain duties, transfers, demotions, early retirement, dismissal, and
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compensation by the government can help victims cope with material
losses and can also represent public acknowledgment by a government of its (or its predecessor’s) wrongdoing.175
Sixth, truth and reconciliation commissions are available.
These are often employed in contexts where the chances of perpetrators being prosecuted, even in the absence of amnesty, are slim.
TRCs are temporary bodies established at the national level to research and report on past patterns of human rights abuses over a certain period of time. Typically, TRCs are created in the aftermath of
prolonged social unrest and conflict, and at a point of political transition to a democratic government. Often, TRCs are part of a process
of national reconciliation and resolution of a civil conflict and are
generally not a substitute for a judicial process.176 TRCs describe a
pattern of violations and do not establish individual criminal behavior.177 Past experience shows that the success of a TRC relies heavily
on the independence, stature, and moral authority of their members.
For countries with limited resources or for countries that lack a
strong and independent judiciary, TRCs may provide the best solution.
The situation in Somalia is anomalous because it is not structured as a war between a government and an opposition, as it is often
disqualification from public office.
penalties.

These can also be added to a conviction of other

175. For example, the Government of Sierra Leone provides monthly payments for the
relatives of those named in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Report. See Volume
Two Report, SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume2.pdf.
Similarly, Argentina
provided a lump-sum compensation for the families of the disappeared or killed, or to those
that were imprisoned for political reasons or forced into exile. See generally MY NEIGHBOR,
MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY (Eric Stover et
al. eds., 2004). In addition to monetary compensation, other forms of compensation may
include medical and educational benefits, waiver of mandatory military service, reinstitution
in public jobs and housing benefits.
176. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001).

TRANSITIONAL

177. TRCs exist for a limited period of time and have specific mandates. See id. Their
structures and procedures differ. Id. Their common goal is to produce and disseminate a
final report, which normally includes conclusions and recommendations. Id. Members of
the TRCs can be well-respected nationals, international experts, or a mix of both. Id. Most
recent commissions have included representatives of local and national human rights NGOs
and other interests groups. Id. One of the main purposes of establishing TRCs is to
encourage social reconciliation through victims’ healing. Id.
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the case in other conflicts. Somalia is complicated by the fact that
there are many actors. In this situation, promoting accountability of
human rights violations may be a particularly delicate and complex
endeavor.
Given these general conditions, in addition to a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, there are several mechanisms that could
be used to account for past human rights abuses. The experience of
prior transitional justice processes may serve as a menu of options for
Somalia and provide useful best practice examples. The assessment
of their achievements can assist the SFG in choosing the mechanisms
that are more suitable for its situation, means, and goals.
In sum, international law can be a fundamental tool to assist
in reconstruction efforts, and can specifically be applied in Somalia.
Indeed, international law can provide and mandate frameworks to
guide a new government’s actions, can assist in providing actions for
government, and can also offer examples of best practices. The final
step is to ensure that mechanisms exist that allow for international
law principles to be properly utilized.
D. Building an International Law Component in Post-Conflict
Reconstruction
International law can be immensely useful in post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia, not only because it provides mandatory
principles, but also because it provides best practices and action
items for the SFG. An initial solution to this complex and important
problem may be simple: increasing access and exposure to international law. Two mechanisms can be used to ensure that that international law is properly utilized: creating a separate international law
component in the intervention framework used by the international
community and securing a sufficient number of international law advisers in all projects.
The international community’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia is principally domestic. UNSOM’s mandate
focuses on human rights, the rule of law, and aid coordination.178 A
separate international law component would ensure that international
law principles are fully considered and assessed. The dearth of international lawyers on staff in international organizations results in lack
of knowledge of the importance, role, and relevance of international
178. See supra Section II.A.
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law; inevitably, it results in its lack of use. Recruiting international
lawyers and using existing international law resources would
strengthen the capacity of international actors and help provide a solution.
CONCLUSION
Somalia’s post conflict reconstruction is—to a great extent—
an international legal problem. However, international law instruments are regrettably absent in the post-conflict reconstruction. I argue that this is a mistake, for international law can and does provide
important tools to guide and assist the reconstruction of Somalia.
Adopting an international law framework will expedite reconstruction, ensure stability, and foster involvement by the international
community. While this Article focuses on Somalia, its conclusions
can be adopted in all post-conflict reconstruction situations.

